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Sociological Research Online, 1997
Treanor, P. (1997) 'Structures of Nationalism'
Sociological Research Online, vol. 2, no. 1,
Received: 10/12/96 Accepted: 15/1/97 Published: 31/3/97
Abstract
The article reviews briefly the theory of nationalism, and introduces
(yet another) definition of nations and nationalism. Starting from this
definition of nationalism as a world order with specific
characteristics, oppositions such as core and periphery,
globalism/nationalism, and realism/idealism are formally rejected.
Nationalism is considered as a purely global structure. Within this, it
is suggested, the number of states tends to fall to an equilibrium
number which is itself falling, this number of states being the current
best approximation to a single world state. Within nationalism variants
are associated with different equilibrium numbers: these variants
compete. Together, as the nationalist structure, they formally exclude
other world orders. Such a structure appears to have the function of
blocking change, and it is tentatively suggested that it derives
directly from an innate human conservatism. The article attempts to
show how characteristics of classic nationalism, and more recent
identity politics, are part of nationalist structures. They involve
either the exclusion of other forms of state, or of other orders of
states, or the intensification of identity as it exists.
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Keywords:
Culture; Globalism; Identity; Innovation; Multiculturalism; Nation
State; Nationalism; Structuralism
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Introduction
1.1 If a world order of states is so arranged that similarity within each
state is maximized, and the number of states is minimized, then that
world order is a nationalist world order, and its components are nation
states. This definition does not start from the characteristics of a
nation, as many definitions of nationalism do. It starts instead from
the world order, considering the nation only in a very abstract sense.
Implicitly this definition is also a functionalist theory of
nationalism, and this is expanded later in this article. The article
closes with a more speculative section on how identity politics could
replace nationalism, but continue its function.
1.2 That nations have a function, and what it is, is nowhere more clearly
expressed than in President Clinton's First Inaugural speech:
When our founders boldly declared America's independence to
the world and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that
America, to endure, would have to change. Not change for
change's sake, but change to preserve America's ideals -
life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Though we march to
the music of our time, our mission is timeless.
1.3 A world of nation states is a world of states built to maintain past
ideals, where change is limited to that necessary for their survival, a
world structured against 'change for the sake of change'.
Structuralism, functionalism, and voluntarism are currently taboo in
the social sciences. Yet, I think it strange to reject the clear
explanations of the purpose of nationalism, so often given by
nationalists and national leaders. In practice it is often an
abdication of moral judgement on the actions of nationalists.
1.4 Before considering the relation of structure and function of nations, a
brief indication of the range of theories of nationalism. Any
comprehensive review of theories of nationalism could only be of book
length (for instance Smith, 1983). The Oxford Reader on Nationalism
(Hutchinson and Smith, 1994) collects examples of the main theories.
1.5 At least nine academic disciplines develop theories of nationalism and
nation states:
* political geography
* international relations
* political science
* cultural anthropology
* social psychology
* political philosophy (normative theory)
* international law and Staatsrecht
* sociology
* history
1.6 It is not surprising that authors in one discipline are unfamiliar with
theory in another, or that there is overlap and duplication. Peter
Alter (1985: p. 169) remarks that the literature can scarcely be
overseen. In this fragmentation among disciplines, a plurality of
theories is at least possible. In turn, plurality of theories should
give more space for innovative theories - more than in a single recent
paradigmatic discipline. (This reverses the standard assumption, that
periods of revolution in science are the periods of innovation in
science. Given fragmentation of disciplines, there might be more
innovation in 'normal science' than through paradigm change.) However,
in this respect nationalism theory is a disappointment. Plurality of
disciplines has not produced an equivalent plurality of theory. Some
common approaches recur across disciplines. Examples of such common
features are the tendency, to approach nationalism on a
country-by-country basis, and to date it as a phenomenon of modernity.
1.7 In any case, it is possible to give some simple (non-inclusive)
categorization of theories of nationalism:
* normative theory of nationalism in political philosophy, for
instance in Walzer (1983).
* theories of nationalism as political extremism. These use a
definition of nationalism common in the media: as equivalent to
jingoism, ethnic hatred, expansionism, militarism, or aggressive
separatism, contrasted with constitutionalism, liberalism or
patriotism (see Connor, 1994: pp. 196 - 209). This approach is
related to 'shopping list' definitions of the extreme right
(Mudde, 1996: pp. 228 - 9).
* modernization theories of nationalism: these form the bulk of
social science theory of nationalism
* primordialist theories, disputing the modern origin of nations
* civilization theories of nationalism, often implying an ultimate
global community. Freud's (1932) comparison of peoples with
primitive organisms is a core version of such a theory of nations.
* historicist theories, which take the existence of nations as
given, and consider their development (or obstacles to that
development).
* social-integrative theories, especially 'substitute religion'
theories
* state formation theories, residually explaining nationalism,
usually as a product of centralizing policy to uniformity
* global system or global order theories, which do not usually
consider internal characteristics of nation states. Theory of
state formation through war combines this with the last category
(for instance, Rasler and Thompson, 1989).
1.8 This is only one categorization, and indicative only. James Goodman
(1996), for instance, categorizes theories of nationalism into five
approaches: ethno-national, modernization, state-centred,
class-centred, and 'uneven development' theories.
Little material is available online but a collection of further
resources has been collected by the author and can be accessed from
here. Links are ordered on the basis of scale, not of categories of
theory, and the list is mainly illustrative.
1.9 Four authors have dominated academic consideration of nationalism in
the last 10 years:
* Ernest Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, 1983).
* Eric Hobsbawm (The Invention of Tradition, 1983, co-edited with
Terence Ranger, and later Nations and Nationalism since 1780,
1992).
* Benedict Anderson (Imagined Communities, 1983).
* Anthony D. Smith (The Ethnic Origins of Nations, 1986)
1.10 The first three are in the category modernization theories, A. D. Smith
is the main 'primordialist'. Gellner's academic field was the
philosophy of sociology, Anderson taught international relations,
Hobsbawm is a social historian, and Smith a sociologist (notes in
Hutchinson and Smith, 1994).
1.11 Gellner's work is the most consistently theoretical: it proposes a
model of the transformation to nation states derived from economic
factors:
So the economy needs both the new type of central culture and
the central state; the culture needs the state; and the state
probably needs the homogeneous branding of its flock ...
(Gellner, 1983: p. 140)
1.12 Anderson does not propose a derivation of this kind, but his central
thesis is that communication and media did facilitate the emergence of
nations as imagined communities. For Anderson, only face- to-face
contact can sustain community: nations are in some sense an illusion.
Both of these views date nationalism as definitively modern. A. D.
Smith's central thesis is that pre-modern equivalents of nations
existed - indirectly invalidating the modernization theories.
Hobsbawm's article on invented tradition appeared earlier, but can be
read as a refutation of the pre-modern origin of national tradition.
Hobsbawm gives examples of how such tradition, even the sustaining myth
of nations, can be borrowed, added to, or simply invented. (A similar
work by Bernard Lewis (1977), did not apparently have the same impact.)
1.13 The so-called resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe after 1989
brought these works to media attention, as well as academic status. (At
one time I could chose between six different courses on them, at one
university.) All of them are also very readable, with much interesting
illustration from the history of nations. No more recent work has made
the same impact, and the fixation on the themes of these authors may
have limited theoretical perspectives.
1.14 Any attempt to compress these works into one paragraph is inadequate.
However, one thing is clear: the authors have not engaged in any wide
speculation about hypothetical worlds of entirely non-national states.
Nations are explained in these theories, not the absence of
non-nations. Insofar as possible alternatives are considered, these are
possible continuations of the mediaeval European order.
Universalist Particularism
2.1 Most nationalism theory pays little attention to nationalism as a world
order. This is surprising, since nationalists themselves so often treat
it as such. Some definitions of nationalism are entirely
particularistic: Elwert (1989: p. 37) says that nationalists only want
a nation for themselves, not others. This is untrue: nationalists have
often wanted other nations. The classic example is Mazzini, who founded
or inspired not only Young Italy, but Young Germany, Switzerland,
Poland, Bohemia and Argentina among others (Mack Smith, 1994: pp.
11-12). Mazzini's vision was global: he saw the peoples as nothing less
then the units of humanity's army:
L'Umanità è un grande esercito che move alla conquista di
terre incognite, contro nemici potenti e avveduti. I Popoli
sono i diversi corpi, le divisioni di quello esercito.
(Mazzini (1860) [1953]: p. 89)
2.2 This is a metaphor, but it should emphasize the extreme universalism of
nationalism. Armies are not known for maximizing autonomy or individual
will. Any listing of the ethical claims of nationalism (the subject of
a separate article) will show that nationalism can not de derived, from
Enlightenment ideas of self-determination. That was the basic thesis of
Elie Kedourie's influential Nationalism (1960, revised 1992).
2.3 Peter Taylor (1989: p. 175) summarizes the world as seen by
nationalists, at three levels (approximately the global, national and
individual).
* The world is, for them, a mosaic of nations which find harmony
when all are free nation states.
* Nations themselves are natural units with a cultural homogeneity
based on common ancestry or history, each requiring its own
sovereign state on its own inalienable territory.
* Individuals all belong to a nation, which requires their first
loyalty, and in which they find freedom.
2.4 This standard nationalist thought says more about nationalism than the
immediate goals of any one nationalist group. For both of these things
- world view and activism - the word 'nationalism' is used. This may be
confusing, but it is also misleading to split nationalism into
'international relations' and 'internal politics', and then include
secessionism in the second category. Basque separatists in Northern
Spain and South-western France want a nation state, and are labelled
nationalists: the governments of France and Spain, who have already got
a nation state, are not. There is undeniably a secessionist
nationalism, with claims against a larger state, such as those of the
ETA. However, the definition at the start of this article is intended
to emphasize the global effect of such movements, and their historical
equivalence to the founders of the states they oppose. The term
nationalism is used here, deliberately, to describe both aspects of the
phenomenon.
2.5 Nationalism is not a particularism. It is a universalism, a consistent
vision or ideology. Autonomy, secession, war and conquest can be
compatible with a universal shared goal. Apparently amending his
earlier view of nationalism, Peter Taylor (1995: p. 10) described one
world as 'the nemesis of interterritoriality'. However, a world of
nations can still be one world, if it is one nationalist world. The
definition of nationalism used here is intended to emphasize this
universal, 'world order', aspect of nationalism. Since nations, united
nations.
2.6 The definition implies that nationalism is a substitute for a world
state. If cultural homogeneity cannot be achieved, because
co-ordination over distance is not perfect, then a strategy of
co-operating local similarities is the best option. The number of
cultures on earth will be the outcome of this strategy. Later, as
states form on the basis of pre-existing ethnic or cultural groups, the
number of states will also derive from this strategy. If there are too
few states, and each too large, they may become internally diverse. If
there are too many, they will differ too much among themselves. It is
therefore not possible to project the long term fall in the number of
states to the point at which only one is left, as Robert Carneiro did
(1976; see Chase- Dunn, 1990). The trend to fewer political units
seemed clear enough to Carneiro, to project a date for world
government: 2300 AD. If however, the nationalist world order is
considered as a global structure, and not seen as competing states,
then there is no certainty of reaching a single world state. If there
is already such a global order, globalization does not imply the
reduction of its components to one. Instead, there is an optimum number
of nation states at any one time, within such a nationalist world
order. That optimum is determined by limits of communications,
transport, and the degree of political and social organization. This
number is falling, but constraints of distance may never be eroded
enough to reduce it to one. The optimum number may in fact exceed the
number of states that now exist. The many separatist movements, the
success of small states, and the fact that there are many more
languages than states, all indicate a world with many more than 185
states: perhaps closer to 1000.
2.7 That implies a change in the nature of the component states. The
classic 19th century European nation state, the basis of most
definitions of nationalism, would best fit a world of between 200 and
500 states. It is a universalism: but there are competing
universalisms, variants within nationalism. This is very clear in
Europe, where these variants are used as programmes for the whole
continent. Most are serious, some are what might be called geopolitical
kitsch (Heineken, 1992; Pedersen, 1992). Classic nationalists speak of
Europe des patries, ethno-nationalists of Europe des ethnies (Heraud,
1993), regionalists of Europe of the regions (Borrás-Alomar, 1994).
Only in Europe are the alternatives formulated so explicitly, but these
universalist structures are implicitly global. They are ways of
dividing the world: alternatives to classic nationalism. In other
words, use of similar terms at a global scale can be expected: a world
of the regions, a world of the peoples, and so on.
2.8 There is what might be called world- nationalism, associated with a
single global state. Its explicit form is world federalism, and plans
to the UN into a sort of world government. This centuries-old tradition
(see ter Meulen, 1917; van der Linden, 1987) is represented by the work
of Richard Falk (1987; 1992) and many others (Marien, 1995: pp. 297 -
301). It is paralleled by the philosophical tradition of
cosmopolitanism (see Toulmin, 1990), and by a belief in globalization.
(Marien's 1995 article covers a very wide range of global visions, from
New Age to neo-liberal.) Then there is inter-culturalism - the division
of the world into 5 to 50 cultures or civilizations, once used in
organicist versions by historians (Demandt, 1978: pp. 96 - 101), and
recently revived by Samuel Huntington (1993). At the same scale are the
pan- nationalist movements, all of them failures until now (Snyder,
1984: p. 254). Then there is classic (inter-) nationalism, the basis of
the existing world order. Next to that is ethno-nationalism (Connor,
1994; Heraud, 1993; Tiryakian, 1985; Watson, 1990). Although there is
no clear distinction between some 'nations' and 'peoples', the scale of
the inter-ethnic world is very different, with up to 10,000 'peoples'.
It is this variant which has the clearest demands at present,
classically stated in the International Covenant on the Rights of
Indigenous Nations (CWIS, 1994). At a similar scale is a
historic-cultural-linguistic regionalism, well organized in Europe (see
Kohr, 1986; Labasse, 1991). These regions are often seen as units of a
future federal Europe, combining regionalism with a weak
pan-nationalism. Finally although it rarely generates separatism, there
is an inter-localism: it sees the small community, the village or
neighbourhood, as the only authentic unit of social organization.
2.9 In all these variants, the possible states share four functional
characteristics (described later), and there is a global order of such
states. I would emphasize that this article is not intended to explain
all aspects of nationalism, but to consider why states do not deviate
from this model.
Core, Periphery, Hegemony
3.1 In universal structures (functional or not) there is logically no core
or periphery - at least, not in the sense of most world system models.
However, competition between universalisms can create this appearance.
Some separatist movements, for instance, defy the expected logic of
core and periphery: the Lega Nord, or Catalonian separatism. Mansvelt
Beck (1991) explains this as an 'inverted core- periphery
relationship'. This kind of explanation can be avoided on the
assumption that there is no real separatism at all. Catalonian
regionalism is regionalism, a model for the whole world, not just
Spain: Basque nationalism is a manifestation of global ethno-
nationalism, and so on. The variants of nationalism are superimposed
universalisms. An ETA attack on a Spanish army barracks is, seen in
this way, a clash of universalisms.
3.2 To this extent, nationalist movements cannot logically be analyzed in
terms of social movement theories. (This is an example of the formal
consequences of adopting the universalist definition used in this
article). Nor can electoral support for 'nationalist parties' be
analyzed. In Britain, the Scottish National Party supports a nation
state, but then so do the Labour Party and the Conservative Party.
Support for nationalism in UK elections is consistently around 99
percent. Again, separatist sentiment is labelled nationalist, but
unionist sentiment is not. In this way, SNP support enters a different
category for electoral analysis: but this is a purely taxonomic effect.
3.3 In a similar way, a rise in the number of states may generate the
illusion of power, struggle and resistance. This may be the case, even
if there is no difference of scale. All units (potential states) might
be comparable, as with Czechoslovakia, Czechia, and Slovakia. These are
all classic European nation states. However, seen from Slovakia,
Czechoslovakia stands for hegemonic culture, an imposed universalism,
oppression and 'power'. Earlier, the Slavic nationalists who inspired
the Czechoslovak state, had opposed the dominance of German-language
culture in Central Europe. Earlier still, German romantic nationalists
had opposed the dominance of French Enlightenment rationalist culture.
All secessionist movements are anti-hegemonic and anti-universalist,
until independence day. After that they become another's hegemonic
universalism, another's 'state'. And, indeed, Slovakia has been
criticized, for its treatment of the Hungarian minority.
3.4 Logically, in a perfect order of nations, there is no dominance or
'power': everyone co-operates a nationalist in sustaining the
structure. This may however involve changing the number of states,
creating the illusion of conflict. People volunteer for military
service: that is said to prove they are willing to die for their
country. It is equally logical to say they die for the functioning of
the world order. That, emphasized, in a perfect order of nations.
3.5 This is an abstraction, true. Nevertheless, it is not such an
abstraction that is has no real effect. Conflicts do involve common
reinforcement, including reinforcement of national structure.
Secession, especially, forces both sides further into their own
identity. Identity makes counter- identity (see Barth, 1969), as with
Slovak and Czech. It is probably true that Czecho-Slovakia is more
nationalist since it split: it is certainly true of Yugoslavia. In this
way the action of individuals in one nation can intensify global
identity, affecting the number of nations in the process. So it is
logically possible that there is no national oppression, nor national
liberation. The 'struggle' is to intensify nationalism, the world
order. Inside it, to oppress or be oppressed as a nation serves the
same function. In practice, an oppressed group will say it is a nation
fighting a state: the state will say it is a nation fighting
terrorists.
Global/National, Order/Chaos
4.1 Another opposition recurrent in theory on nations is that between the
national and the global (see Arnason, 1990). The nation state and
national culture are being eroded by global communication - it is often
said. It is said that Internet will dissolve nations. Much the same
thing was said about satellite television, air travel, radio, the
telegraph, and railways. Nation states are still here. Yet few people
are sceptical about 'globalization' (Cox, 1992; Smith, 1990), and in a
sense there is no reason to be. There is no erosion of the national by
the global, but only because there is nothing to erode. Nationalism is
100% global: a world order cannot logically be further globalized.
4.2 The components of an order do not stand in opposition to it: certainly
not in the sense implied by the term 'globalization'. The implicit
assumption is that nations are particular entities, necessarily at a
sub-global level. In other worlds, the whole idea starts from the
assumption that there is no universal nationalism. If I claim the
people on the pitch at a football match walked there by chance, and I
see them playing football, then I could say they are being 'football-
ized'. In fact they went there as a group, for that purpose.
4.3 The question is why there is such enthusiasm for the concept of
globalization. First, it is in the nature of nationalism itself. The
world of nations is an imperfect substitute for a homogenous world
state: it is logical for nationalists to hope it is approaching.
Secondly, the enthusiasm is in any case matched by the
anti-universalist ideas mentioned above. There are books and
conferences on the coming global state, but equally on the rise of
regions. It seems possible to combine two scales of thought, for
instance in cultural pan-syncretism (see Nederveen Pieterse, 1993) or
sub-state federation (Bengoetxea, 1993). Thirdly, this is only one
example of a pattern: for each of the level of scale of nationalism,
there are possible upward and downward transitions. Shifts from the
ethno-regional to the global, for instance, or from pan-nationalism to
linguistic regionalism.
4.4 Only three of these possibilities are active at present:
* globalism, more normative than descriptive
* anti-hegemonic criticism of existing national states and their
cultures, without any territorial effect as yet. In reaction there
is some new defence of the nation state, especially in response to
multiculturalism and identity politics. This applies most in
high-immigration western industrialized countries, where it is a
major issue. (The U.S.A. especially: see Schlesinger, 1992.) In
any case, more recent interest in fusion, hybridity, and 'crossing
boundaries' favours pan- nationalism. Separatist identity politics
seems on the way out.
* ethno-nationalism, and in Europe regionalism at the same
subnational scale - which enjoys some support within the EU (van
der Knaap, 1994).
This last is by far the most active shift. The next ten years are
unlikely to see a world government, and the US is unlikely to break up
(and does not need Arthur Schlesinger to save it): but it might see an
independent Vlaanderen or Catalunya, or the definitive break-up of
Afghanistan.
4.5 The world order of nations is therefore characterized by both secession
and fusion, but it is not being 'torn apart'. It is a structure being
rebuilt to function better. All these shifts in scale merely substitute
one universalism for another, all variants of one world order. There is
no dramatic fragmentation, and no paradigmatic shift to one world
community. No shift is needed.
4.6 It also follows, from the definitions used here, that a world of nation
states cannot be chaotic or anarchic. The academic discipline of
international relations is influenced by the idea of a slow progress
toward the imposition of some kind of order on warring, aggressive
states, the tradition of, for instance, Hedley Bull (1977, 1984). This
tradition concedes some 'order in the system'. However, logically there
cannot be anything else but order. A world order is by definition not
disorder: international relations are by definition 'idealist' in
International Relations terms, and a national state cannot be a
Machtsstaat. So called realism models a world of aggressively
competitive states - sometimes identified with mediaeval Europe. From
this a recognition of commonalities may emerge, and states may
co-operate, bringing order and peace. Those who consider this inherent
or inevitable are usually classified as idealist.
4.7 But war is not disorder: Carneiro's model, the simplest possible,
demonstrates that states disappear through 'competitive exclusion'
until there is one left: there are many wars, but it is an ordered,
linear process (see Cioffi-Revilla, 1991). The realist/idealist dispute
ignores the type of state involved. The question is not why there are
so many wars between nations, but why there are so few wars between
non-nations. Not why there is ethnic cleansing, but why there is so
little non-ethnic cleansing. Not what is international relations, but
why there are only inter-national relations. Any attempt to imagine a
fundamentally non-national world, should make clear how stable the
world of nations is. Nation states can apparently fight each other,
without risk of emergence of new state forms in the alleged 'chaos'.
Other Worlds
5.1 It may seem that all this imposes a simplistic order on a complex
world. However it is nationalists who want to impose a simple
structure, and they have been remarkably successful. Of course the
world order is not perfect, and states do have autonomous interests.
These may be of the kind graphically attributed to them in pre-war
Geopolitik (Schmidt, 1929), or less obsessively in recent geopolitical
atlases. Nations do sometimes act as entities 'seeking access to the
sea', or 'control of river basins', or resources, or historical
territories. The Schmidt-Haack Atlas maps tens of different types of
claim, and some were later used by Germany. However, if all nation
states consistently acted like this, there would be constant all-state
war.
5.2 There is also the possibility that a state will turn against the world
order, a real renegade state. Usually this term merely indicates a
state disliked by western policy makers: see Dror (1971) on 'crazy
states'. A real renegade state would have to stop being a nation state:
no-one speaks of 'crazy nations'. More probable is that nationalism as
a universal order conflicts with other universalisms; other world
orders of one or more states, or perhaps a stateless world. The
definition of nationalism used here, defines it as a monolith with
great historical continuity. It should then react to competing
monoliths, as a unit. The Greek polis is often cited as the prototype
of nations, indeed of all political community. It was also a unit
within an order of similar states. That Hellenic order may have had a
proto-national identity itself. However, as an order of city states, it
was in intermittent conflict with Asian empires. The present order of
nation states covers the globe, however, so that any competing world
will be found within it.
5.3 There is at present one clear example of a competing world order:
theocratic religious universalism, of the kind promoted (in Britain) by
the Muslim Unity Organization. It advocates a world caliphate, khilafa.
It is not accidental that this group operates from Britain: the
existing Islamic nation states would be the first to disappear on the
road to the caliphate. However small such groups are, they have a
coherent and radical alternative not just to 'the West', but to the
whole existing world:
...there is a long and still vibrant tradition of Muslim
agitation against nationalism and the nation state. The most
recent manifestation of this agitation has had Shi'i
inspiration, but there are no significant differences between
Sunni and Shi'a on this question, or between Arab and
non-Arab Muslims. Feeling that Islam's decline is due chiefly
to the adoption of Western ideas and culture, all express
pessimism and suggest a radical restructuring of the world
order. (Piscatori, 1986: p. 145)
5.4 A complete alternative world order is unlikely to control any territory
within the world order it rejects. It is however not adequate to
consider such universalist Islamic movements as 'social movements'
within existing nation states. They cannot be accommodated within the
'public domain' of these states, as suggested by John Rex (1996) in a
previous article in Sociological Research Online. This has nothing to
do with their immigrant or ethnic status: a Catholic theocracy would
not fit into a liberal democratic nation state either.
Blocking
6.1 As long as there are nations, there will be no caliphate; it is neither
a people, nor a region, nor a nation, nor a culture. Structurally,
nationalism excludes other entities from state status. Nationalism is a
blocking world order: it excludes other worlds. It is difficult to
imagine all these possible worlds from inside the world of nations, and
that is part of its success. Any attempt to imagine them will lead to
apparent absurdity.
6.2 What nationalism blocks, above all, is change. The definition of
nationalism as tending to total homogeneity implies stability also. The
order blocks, but not without direction. It may well be, in itself,
empty: it does not define, for instance, what language will be spoken
in the third nation east of the Rhine. That does not stop it having a
purpose. If the world order of nations (as defined here) is
superimposed on a world, it will block change in time, and exclude the
alternative worlds that are possible at any point in time. That is an
ethical choice, and the ethics of nations are outside the scope of this
article, as noted.
6.3 If nationalism is chosen, someone chose it. No one person invented
nationalism: the most logical 'someone' is, exactly as Mazzini
suggested, humanity. There is some theory which links the nation to the
psyche: the most obvious areas of interest are self-determination
(Ronen, 1979) and personal identity, sense of self (Bloom, 1990). I
suggest the structure of nationalism derives from an innate human
conservatism. This is no more absurd than saying that structures of
reservoirs and water supply derive from an innate human need for water.
It does not imply that all persons at all times are absolutely
conservative. (Nor does it contradict biology: change causes stress.)
6.4 How can the world order of nations answer such an innate aversion to
change? First, in that it gives a monopoly of state formation - and so
of sovereignty - to nations. Not that all states correspond exactly to
one nation: again, the point is how few states correspond to
non-national entities. They do exist as historical curiosities: the
Vatican, and the autonomous Agio Oros (Athos) in Greece. Some
nationalists have a horror of a state without a nation: see Heraud's
comment on the Vatican as a product of History, 'qui est violence'
(1993: p. 11). If national divisions were not dominant, there should be
more of these counter-examples. Secondly, the nation itself is
past-based. Trans-generationality is a key characteristic of nations,
and found in many definitions of nation. Writing on the subjective
experience of cultural identity, A. D. Smith (1990: p. 179) names three
components of shared experience: a sense of transgenerational
continuity, shared memories, and a sense of common destiny. Collapsing
the three into one gives the purpose of a nation: it exists to project
the past (as collectively remembered) into the future, as little
changed as possible. Nationalists almost do not ignore the future:
Nations are thus projects for the future and have the right
to self-determination in order to organise their future.
(Bengoetxea, 1993: p.95)
6.5 However in a national world order, nations are the only entities with
self-determination and territory, and they are past- constituted. Just
as with the world order, the nation is empty but not directionless:
superimpose a nation on a heritage, and it will preserve it. In fact it
will make the past into a 'heritage', one of the metaphors of
possession common in nationalism. It is logical in nations, that the
past should increase its share of economy, society and culture (see
Horne, 1984; Lowenthal, 1985), that territory undergoes
'heritage-ization' (Walsh, 1992: pp. 138 - 147), that memory is
cultural (see Assman, 1988) and that its preservation is a task of the
state. Despite Lowenthal's title, the past is not treated as an apart
entity, but rather divided up to correspond to existing nations. The
world is thus occupied by states projecting parallel pasts into the
future: there is no non-memory space, no space which is not of the
past.
6.6 Thirdly, the nations are in principle eternal, and so the nation state,
and so the world order. (Dependent territories and mandates can have a
formal time limit, but this relates to a transfer of power. Mandate
territories become independent nation states, or join an existing
neighbour.) The idea of setting up a state for a limited time for a
specific purpose is alien to nationalism. The exceptions which show it
is possible - for example extraterritorial mining concessions - are
curiosities in a world of nations. The projection of the past will
continue.
6.7 Fourth, and most specifically, no state has ever been established for
the primary purpose of change. This logical possibility is not limited
by available technology or culture - it could have been done 1000 years
ago.
6.8 Returning to the definition: there logically exists a general class of
orders of states where the boundaries are not drawn so as to maximise
change. In other words, a class of change-limiting orders, in effect
change-minimizing orders. The order of nations is probably the most
effective of these. Formally, it is an order of coterminous states
covering the entire land surface, formed by transgenerational identity
communities, claiming a monopoly of state formation, and eternal
legitimacy. All the scale variants of nationalism conform to this
definition.
6.9 These four functional characteristics of the nationalist world order
emphasize how different it is from other possible orders, and how it
has excluded them for a long time. In effect it has become superimposed
on the world, by choice. It would be inaccurate to say it arrived at
one instant. No-one can give a definitive date for when nationalism
began: Marcu (1976: pp. 3 - 15) quotes 41 different views on the issue.
Instead, a structure has been elaborated and intensified, and the
beginnings of other structures have been abandoned. Compare the five
possible futures of thirteenth century Europe suggested by Tilly (1975:
p. 26), or the different routes to the national identity suggested by
Armstrong (1982: pp. 283 - 300). The intensification has increased in
the last 200 years, as nations become more national.
6.10 It is a property of nationalism that intensifying the national identity
intensifies the world order. Most theory of nationalism attributes this
process to the state, at most to the interaction of state and civil
society:
Après avoir ajusté à leur échelle propre l'armée, la justice,
la religion et l'administration, ils en viennent à
nationaliser le marché (impôts, douanes, lois et règlements,
poids et mesures, etc.) à nationaliser l'école (langue
officielle, programmes, examens, etc.) et, de proche en
proche, à nationaliser encore la conscription, les services
publics, certaines entreprieses au moins (chemins de fer,
postes, ports etc.) ... l'Etat tend à façonner toute la
societé civile, laquelle tend, en retour, a soumettre l'Etat
à ses finalités propres... (Fossaert, 1994: p. 195)
After having adjusted the army, the courts, religion and
administration to national scale, they start to national-ise
the market (taxes, customs, laws and regulations, weights and
measures), to national-ise the schools (official language,
educational programmes, exams), and then to nationalise in
turn, conscription, public service, some business enterprises
(railways, post, ports) ... The State forms civil society,
which in turn begins to use the State for its own goals...
(Fossaert, 1994: p. 195)
6.11 The logic of nationalism however, is that this is a process of
convergence driven from below, that the national identity is exactly
what A. D. Smith (1990: p. 179) says it is not: an average. The state
is merely an instrument. Too large a state and the convergence will be
ineffective, too small and the averages will differ too much - and so
back to the starting definition. Neither secession nor conquest disturb
this process in the long run: the new nations will have their own
'nationalization', their own convergence. In other words, even at the
level of the individual state, attitudes to change can determine the
degree of national uniformity. Secession, in effect, punishes the state
for allowing too much difference in the population. This is not an
abstraction: many nationalists explicitly value homogeneous
communities.
6.12 In any case, daily reality in most nations is not secession, but less
spectacular processes of emancipation. Nations are not perfect: they
include minorities (or majorities) which do not conform to the national
ideal, but have no other national identity. Repeatedly, such groups
chose to integrate into the nation, rather than allow non-national
secession. They pressure the state for inclusion, and often try to
adjust the national identity, through cultural politics. Once again,
there is no political-geographic inevitability in this: if people can
secede as a nation they can secede as something else. They chose not
to, with some historical exceptions. Again, the remarkable feature of
the world order of nations is not the number of secessionist movements,
but the fact that all of them represent a people, or a nation.
6.13 A good example of the intensity of this choice is the campaign of gay
and lesbian groups - especially in the U.S.A. - against the military
ban on service, for 'the right to die for my country'. It seems absurd
to demand to be killed in an army which discriminates against you. The
emotions here can only be nationalist, U.S.A. nationalist: a sort of
desperate desire to be part of an identity, to conform, to belong, not
to be different. This is an example of genuine anger directed against
the state, for failing to homogenize the nation. The logically possible
alternatives do not occur. Despite the influence of religion in the
U.S.A., there is no comparable demand for the 'right to die for my
church', let alone any other organization. There is also no serious
secessionist movement of gays and/or lesbians despite decades of social
organization. When Cardinal Archbishop Quarracino of Buenos Aires
proposed (in August 1994) a 'separate country for homosexuals', he had
to publicly apologise, saying it was a joke. He did not know, probably,
of Queer Nation (Bérubé, 1991; Chee, 1991), nor that it makes no
territorial demands, despite its name.
6.14 Many processes, then, which may seem separate or contradictory, can be
described in a structure of nationalism, starting from its formal
definition as a specific world order. Integration through formalism is
a characteristic of conspiracy theories: does all this imply a vast
conspiracy involving almost all humans over centuries? Not necessarily:
it is possible to generate complex structures from simple rules. The
most general rule for a nationalist world as a blocking world order
would be approximately: 'if there is change, intensify identity'. A
second rule might be to intensify identity preferably by fusion or
accretion, and only if that failed, by secession. However, it is not
necessary to imply a hidden formal grammar of nationalism. People do
not need one: they can reflect on what is happening, and produce open
doctrines of complex action - as did Mazzini, and other nationalist
ideologists.
Identity Politics and Territory
7.1 National identity links the individual to the world order. It has also
been a central theme in universities over the last 15 - 20 years.
Especially so, in English-speaking countries where a liberal political
tradition is confronted by ethnic diversity (Rex, 1996). Some of that
academic activity has an obvious link to nationalism, ethnic studies
for example. More generally, there is an interest in what might be
called structures of cultural identity, which may have a spatial or
territorial counterpart.
7.2 In the US the work of bell hooks, for instance, shows a transition from
marginality as a 'site of deprivation' to a 'site of resistance' to a
'site one stays in' (hooks, 1990: p. 341), which is almost a summary of
secessionist nationalism. In this way nationalist models, even of
classic Mazzinian nationalism, may be adopted for identity politics.
(That is, without necessarily breaking up existing nation states.) This
continuity from 19th century nationalism to recent identity politics
has yet to be researched. Even before the First World War, the
Austro-Marxist Bauer (1907) anticipated the model of a multicultural
state, now common in political speech in western Europe. Already in
1944, Louis Adamic described the United States as 'A Nation of
Nations', and President Kennedy echoed the idea in the sixties
(Kennedy, 1964). In contrast to Benedict Anderson's view (1992) that
multiculturalism is transitional, there is no reason why a nation state
can not be a Vielvölkerstaat, with diversity as a national value. The
ultimate logic would be to make each nation itself a microcosm of the
world order: united nations of united nations.
7.3 It seems possible that use of identity can be further intensified,
possibly to the point that a non-territorial structure of
transgenerational identity replaces classic nationalism. For an example
of the new politics, see the post-structuralist critique of Transgender
Nation by Newitz (1993), and other texts at the same site. The new
world order could be 'syncretic', a term from the study of religion
(see Colpe, 1987). It could be a world order of gender pluralism,
trans- diaspora cultures, trans-trans hybrids, and other new
combinations of the existing - suppressing change by the volume of
diversity.
7.4 More probable is, that the parallels between the new politics and the
old, will reinforce classic nationalism. Take this (random) example: a
comment on bell hooks from a recent paper on spaces of citizenship:
In hooks's case these 'homes' entailed her grandparent's
house and then the black neighbourhoods containing this house
and also her own, and the implication is that these houses
and neighbourhoods were rather more to her than 'just' sites
of belonging, they were also sites where black people could
escape from the antagonism, anger and attacks which arose
when they trespassed on white space (however legitimate in
legal terms their presence in this white space would actually
be). In other words, hooks indicates something of how black
people can never be citizens confidently occupying the spaces
of white society, but hints too at how they may find ways of
trying to foster alternative locales in which some sense of
being a citizen - this time of a distinctively black world -
is made possible. (Painter & Philo, 1995: pp. 116 - 7)
7.5 Change some names and this becomes much less friendly:
In Tudjman's case these 'homes' entailed his grandparent's
house and then the Croat neighbourhoods containing this house
and also his own, and the implication is that these houses
and neighbourhoods were rather more to him than 'just' sites
of belonging, they were also sites where Croat people could
escape from the antagonism, anger and attacks which arose
when they trespassed on Yugoslav space (however legitimate in
legal terms their presence in this Yugoslav space would
actually be). In other words, Tudjman indicates something of
how Croat people can never be citizens confidently occupying
the spaces of Yugoslav society, but hints too at how they may
find ways of trying to foster alternative locales in which
some sense of being a citizen - this time of a distinctively
Croat world - is made possible.
7.6 And of course it was made possible.
7.7 There is no need to reinvent nationalism, for nations have not
disappeared, but some people seem determined to reinvent it anyway. The
structure of nationalism is being altered, but its singularity and
purpose are not. It remains one structure, one world order excluding
other worlds. The man who more than anyone, was the founding father of
modern nationalism, Johann Gottlieb Herder, wrote in 1774:
Ist nicht das Gute auf der Erde ausgestreut? Weil eine
Gestalt der Menschheit und ein Erdstrich es nicht fassen
konnte, wards geteilt in tausend Gestalten, wandelt - ein
ewiger Proteus! - durch alle Weltteile und Jahrhunderte
hin...(Herder, 1990/1774: p. 36)
7.8 Nationalism is a Proteus, but it changes only to prevent change.
Rewriting Herder in the negative gives the judgement of nationalism:
Only that which is already strewn about the Earth, is good.
[Image]
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