visit federalism
World-nationalism: normative globalism as pan-nationalism
A world-state has no special ethical status: this article is about
the ethical claims of normative globalism. Since this paper was
first written, the values it criticises have acquired more
influence, although a world government is still a long way off.
The recent Human Development Report 1999 from the UNDP has
detailed proposals on "global governance" including organisational
structure and finance.
------------------------------------------------------------------
ABSTRACT. Recent works on normative globalism or political
cosmopolitanism (Held, Falk, Miller) continue a long tradition. It
claims an 'ethical' status, reinforced by the usual contrast with
the 'amoral' realist tradition. This is misleading. In its
rejection of widely spread sovereignty or autonomy, it shares the
central feature of nationalism. It is a form of pan-nationalism.
The arguments for global political institutions - based on unity
as value, common status, common problems, peace, and historicism -
are logically flawed. They cannot justify one type of state
against others. The UN, too, cannot claim any ethical superiority.
The alternatives to the present world order are other world
orders, not reduction to one planetary nation state.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The idea of a world state is ancient in itself: Alexander Demandt traces it
back 3450 years to Pharaoh Thutmosis III, Friedrich Berber 4350 years to
Sargon of Akkad. [1] Nevertheless normative globalism continues to exist,
and continues to claim some form of moral superiority. As at the end of the
19th century, or in the 1920's, there is a revival of interest - especially
since 1989. This interest, both academic and non-academic, (recently
reviewed by Michael Marien) [2] is visible in title combinations of "global"
or "world", with "governance", "sustainability", "concern", "responsibility"
or "future". Given the revival in normative ethics since the 1960's, the
claims of normative globalism rest increasingly on ethical arguments. Many
of these are accepted at face value, as is shown by their unquestioned
appearance in introductory texts for students. Other than the standard
objections of classic nationalism - including proletarian internationalism
[3] - normative globalism is rarely criticised. This contributes to its
image of moral superiority. (So does the fact that political opposition to
it in the West now comes from populists and conspiracy theorists, although
it was also a feature of some anti-communist propaganda). In the academic
world, too, realism/nationalism forms a sort of duopoly with globalism. In
fact, most of the world's population are committed both to their own
national and/or ethnic identity, and to some form of religious and/or
humanist idea of a universal moral community: those who reject both are a
small minority.
The "ethical" image of normative globalism is entirely false and misleading.
Normative globalism is a pan-nationalism. Its current version (obviously
different from the universalism of ancient theocracies) belongs firmly in
the political tradition of nationalism. Normative globalists are, at best,
people who are so conditioned by living in a world of nations that the only
alternative they can imagine to 180 nations is: one large nation. Only a
nationalist, committed to the idea of political or cultural unity in some
form, would see a world-nation as the end of history. [4]
WORLD NATIONALISM
The central characteristic of nationalism, which I will not argue further
here, is its denial of sovereignty to entities other than nations or
peoples. (See the appendix on the characteristics of the national world
order). Although not logically consequent on this, all nations in history
translate this lack of sovereignty (for elements within national territory)
into pressure for cultural, social, political and/or economic unity. This is
replicated in the politics of normative globalists: none of them explain how
to get away from the World Government if you oppose it.
Formally the equivalence can be so stated: nationalism has as a central
political demand the establishment of a state on a territory, exclusive of
other states on that territory, populated by a group formed by involuntary
membership of an inclusive category, usually "descendants of past
inhabitants of the territory". Normative globalism seeks a state with
planetary territory, and a monopoly of that territory, paralleling the
monopoly claim of nationalism itself. [5] All humans would belong to that
state (as citizens) by reason of being human and/or inhabiting the planet,
without any choice in the matter. In its central claim normative globalism
is equivalent to nationalism: it is semantically correct to describe it as a
form of nationalism.
In this usage "normative globalism" as movement or ideology seeks some form
of planetary political unit with global authority, executive, legislative,
and/or judicial. [6] It includes all forms of global federalism or
confederalism, planetary Bundesstaat or Staatenbund. It includes proposals
for global taxation, which will require such authority.[7] It does not
include political demands for increased international co-operation, which
leave the present states system intact. The concept of 'global governance'
seems intermediate. Some authors use it almost as a synonym for the working
of the states system.[8] In contrast, the Commission on Global Governance is
a more definitively globalist institution, an example of a well-organised
lobby group. [9] More diffuse political support for normative globalism
comes from, for instance, the member groups of OneWorldOnline (mainly from
English speaking countries). [10] In the academic world, recent
comprehensive examples of normative globalism are David Held's 'Democracy
and the Global Order', Lynn Miller's 'Global Order: Values and Power in
International Politics' and Richard Falk's 'On Humane Governance'. [11]
The closest equivalent to this normative globalism in recognised nationalism
are the pan-nationalisms, excluding however pan-Islamism, since a universal
religion does not need a "pan-" prefix.[12] They are distinguished from
classic nationalism by: a less defined territory, more cultural and
linguistic divisions among the population of the proposed state, more
willingness to accept multi-lingualism, less emphasis on descent, and a more
expansionist (pan-Germanism) or defensive (pan-Africanism) character. Aside
from formal equivalence, normative globalism shares some of these
characteristics, but also has specific characteristics, and internal
variants. For instance, despite the extreme range of global visions reviewed
by Marien, from Brzezinski to New Age, a few common features emerge:
* a claimed paradox of increasing unity and increasing fragmentation
* an often extreme historicism
* a tendency to project issues in the author's society and culture onto
the rest of the world.
FORMAL AND SYNCRETIC VERSIONS
There are two main forms of normative globalism. The first is formed by
formal world-state ideologies, such as world federalism.[13] That includes
pro-UN movements seeking a great expansion of UN powers and activity, and
its de facto transformation into a form of world government. This last
option has the best academic backing: the best example is the work of
Richard Falk.[14] The second variant is less recognised and formalised:
normative syncretism. This concept derives from the history of religions.
[15] It includes what is now often called transculturality or
interculturality, the fusion of cultures into hybrid forms. The present
impact of syncretist ideas in Western culture is great, as visible in
widespread use of prefixes such as trans-, cross-, inter-, and multi-. When
this is advocated as a normative goal culminating in a single hybrid, it is
a pan-syncretism. Given cultural trends, there will probably be more
examples of the kind of global cultural pan-syncretism described/ advocated
by Jan Nederveen Pieterse. [16] It could be that a world government is more
likely to emerge from the increasing co-operation of small ethno-national
and cultural movements (indigenous peoples, secessionist, in Europe
regionalist) than from the nationalism of existing nation states - from
fusions of "sub-state nationalisms" or "subnationalisms" usually seen as
disintegrative. [17]
The idea of transnational actors, organisations, or movements by-passing the
nation state on the way to global governance also belongs in this syncretic
category, although it is at present more wish than fact. There are certainly
a large number of non-governmental organisations (ngo's) with cross-border
contacts, for instance the thousands linked by Internet through the
Institute for Global Communications and the Association for Progressive
Communications. [18] However, they usually work through a limited number of
central "inter-ngo's" or ingo's. [19] Descriptions such as "women as
nonstate, antistate and transtate actors" show how such concepts can inflate
to define any person as globally active.[20] It may be logically valid to
claim that IGC and APC represent the 'true' reality of the world,
superseding the states system: contesting such claims is pointless. The
point is that an emotional commitment to global unity via transnationalism
certainly exists, to produce for instance this description: "Engaging
corporate, state and interstate actors on a number of levels, Greenpeace's
actions draw out the transversal and interrelated character of contemporary
politics....Greenpeace activities traverse state boundaries and call them
into question. Rather than occupying the striated spaces of state and
interstate, the politics of Greenpeace seems to occupy the smooth space in
between." [21] Despite the unconventional language, it is the old monopoly
claim of nationalism which is reproduced here: there is only one smooth
space, and no-one can escape the transnational actors.
In syncretism there need be no paradox between fragmentation and unity. In
western thought this opposition (nationalism versus globalism) is supposed
to parallel the divide between for instance Herder and Kant, Romanticism and
Enlightenment, or alternatively between Hegel and Kant. [22] It should be
clear that the approach in this article places both nationalism and
cosmopolitanism on one side, in opposition to alternative world orders of
non-nation states. Put simply: the realist tradition is in fact part of the
idealist tradition, since all realists are nationalists. Real "realists"
would accept that any group can form a state and claim any territory. From
that perspective it is clear that limiting state formation to nations is in
fact a very effective device for limiting inter-state conflict.
Normative globalism has one more distinctive characteristic: it is
associated with political-philosophical positions, in a way that the
pan-nationalisms are not. Formal world federalism is almost always linked to
rights-based liberalism, in particular the Anglo-American tradition. [23]
(Some world federalists are convinced that the US constitution must serve as
a model for the world). A second area of concern for globalists is
environmentalism and eco-ethics. Conversely, green parties often have some
inherent sympathy for world government, balanced by sympathy for
ethno-nationalism and localism. A third concern is also derived from
eco-ethics: transgenerational ethics, in particular global responsibility to
future generations.
ETHICAL CLAIMS AND OBJECTIONS
None of these variants, and none of the claims of normative globalism, are
"ethical" in the sense of morally good. Globalism is not inherently
superior: its claims are often however based on this assumption. All the
ethical claims can be disputed - as can arguments for a world state, most
usually: unity as value, common status, peace, common problems and
historical trend.
1] Size of territory is not an ethical factor in itself, although a minimum
size may be a precondition for some state activities. An ethical statement
concerning a large territory is not in itself superior to one about a small
territory, although it may affect more people. Federalism as norm or
ideology cannot in itself justify a single state (and is in any case rarely
so used). [24] A single state is not necessarily or inherently superior to a
plurality (or absence) of states.
2] Being human confers no obligation to enter into a state with other
humans, any more than birth obliges the author to work with Gerry Adams. The
same applies to residence on the planet. A category is not a collectivity:
no moral obligations derive - from membership of a category - to other
members of that category. (Otherwise any randomly listed persons could be
declared obligated merely by being on the same list).
3] In reality, categories are generally made into a political collectivities
by force, as so often in classic nationalism. All nation states enforce by
law collective obligations, criminalising decollectivisation as sedition,
rebellion, secession, or treason. A world state (even in confederal form)
would have to criminalise these too, or would break up rapidly: in this
sense it would share the coercive aspects of nationalism.
4] A world state cannot be justified from 'the common problems facing
humanity'. Even if there are such problems, those facing them are again a
category, and not a collectivity. In many cases the commonality is disputed
anyway. (Typical is the conflict on pollution norms between industrialised
countries, which contribute the bulk of present pollution, and the newly
industrialising countries, which will do so in 20 to 30 years). Even where a
problem by definition affects everyone, that is not evidence that its
solution is collective. The argument that those who can solve the problem
should form the state is applied by globalists to 'humanity', but logically
it implies a technocracy. Except in consumption patterns, most people will
never take action on any 'global problem': humans are not in any real sense
a problem-solving political collective justifying state formation.
5] The classic argument of normative globalism from Saint-Pierre, Bentham
and Kant on, is 'peace among peoples' or 'global peace'. The simple formal
objection to this is that there is not one but many possible conditions of
peace: therefore no single condition can be justified from it. It is true
that most schemes for world peace refer to more than simple absence of war.
However that simply circularises the argument: "True world peace is X (e.g.
government by the UN General Assembly, or North-South transfer taxes) -
therefore we must have X to achieve true world peace".
The emphasis on peace conceals the fact that most nation states, most of the
time, are not at war with each other. This reflects a fundamental truth
about nationalism (this too I will not further argue here): as a universal
ideology it is already global, in the sense that there is an almost
undisputed world order of nation states. Combine this with the formal
equivalence of globalism and nationalism, and it is clear that the issue in
globalist peace schemes is not peace. It is a dispute among nationalists
about how many states there should be - 180, 500, or one. (In this
perspective the co-existence of state-centric and global 'multi-centric
sub-systems' which James Rosenau sees as characterising the present, is
historically inherent to nationalism. There will be pressures for more
nations, for less nations, and for one nation.) [25] One or more of these
numbers may in fact result in peace, but that again is no argument, since
other non-national combinations might do so too. Formally: no form of state
which has historically existed as plural conflicting states may, by reducing
its number to one, legitimately claim a monopoly of world territory.
A related historicist argument is that the inevitable trend of world history
is to a world state. There is an undeniable long term fall in the number of
state or statelike entities, [26] but neither empirical conclusion nor moral
imperative can be drawn from this. It is a logical error, the historicist
form of the naturalistic fallacy, to conclude that such trends should be
continued. The trend applies in any case to a limited range of state types
which have dominated state formation: states based on single ethnic groups
or sub-groups, and multi-ethnic empires dominated by a conquering ethnic
group. [27] If for instance state formation had been based on universal
religions, the number of states in the last two millennia would have been
much smaller, and more stable (compare the map of religions in an atlas with
the map of nations). New state types may therefore stop, or reverse, the
long term trend to fewer states, or one state. Similarly, processes of
globalisation, in whatever sense, may be reversed. [28]
The historicist claim about falling numbers of states parallels more general
claims of historical process, of transition to an era of peace based on
globalism in some form. Media, politicians and academics often share the
vision, explicit in the work of Hedley Bull, that some form of transition
from disorder or anarchy among states takes place in the long term. [29]
Similarly there is a widespread belief in the erosion of the state, meaning
the nation state, as a closed container or arena. [30] At worst there is a
mythology of "the Westphalia system of states", to which the evils of
nationalism are ascribed: it is then supposed to give way to "global
politics". [31] Similarly the "war system" is supposed to end with the birth
of the "global peace system". [32]
No normative judgment can be derived from such historical metaphors or
periodisations, of which there are hundreds of conflicting versions. [33]
Authors cannot consistently emphasise pluralism and diversity, and then
reduce history to one or two great transitions: all periodisations are
counter-pluralist. [34] These defects apply especially to cyclic or
succession-of-empire theories which predict a global state. [35]
Nevertheless, many people want to define the present as a great transition,
or as a new era, or believe it is. This 'Epochenillusion' is itself a
historic phenomenon, traceable back to the 16th century. [36]]
Concretely: nationalists cannot first organise centuries of warfare, and
then demand a permanent monopoly of the world because they have now
abandoned "the destructive and dismal rationality of Westphalia, Machiavelli
and Clausewitz....", [37] for which the rest of the world must be grateful.
The argument from peace for cosmopolitanism closely parallels the argument
from peace for democracy, the normative version of the "democratic peace
proposition". [38] The error in these arguments is shown by a few examples
of propositions: a) "Few democracies fight each other, so all states should
be democratic, to secure world peace". b) "No two national-socialist states
went to war with each other, so all states should be national-socialist, to
secure world peace". c) "All two Chinese-speaking states are often on the
brink of war, therefore Chinese-speaking states must be forbidden, to secure
world peace".
The premise may be correct, the conclusions do not follow. Formally: where
there is more than one means to secure en end, no single means can be
justified by the end.
Even more formally, the properties of interactions between entities of a
class A cannot a priori determine the properties of interactions between
entities of a class B, unless class A is identical to class B. Nor can the
interactions in one class determine the properties of entities in another
class. Therefore the moral superiority of one kind of state (on whatever
scale) to another kind of state cannot be inferred from the moral
superiority (on the same or another scale) of the relations between states
of the first kind. This applies where the relationships are determined by
number (although a single state has no 'relationships' except
self-equivalence).
Any possible single-state world will have no inter-state wars: world peace
is no argument for any one of these possibilities in particular.
Nevertheless normative globalists continue to argue from "peace" for what is
clearly a planetary nation state, and so implicitly argue against other
world orders (of one or more states). Logically, neither war nor peace,
neither respect for sovereignty nor erosion of it, neither intervention nor
co-operation, neither plurality nor uniqueness, can justify the nation
state.
THE UNITED NATIONS
Aside from such formal objections, there are direct political and social
objections to normative globalism in the pro-UN form. (In world federalist
literature there is a shift to seeing not the UN, but the European Union, as
model for a future world government). Firstly, the UN is the largest
organisation in history composed entirely of nation states (the Vatican
excepted). As such it is probably also the most nationalist organisation in
history. It is inextricably linked to the idea of nationalism (and so
incidentally the worst possible organisation to intervene in for instance
ex-Yugoslavia). It cannot be open to, or objectively consider, territorial
alternatives to nationalism.
Secondly, the UN is structurally elitist. Its personnel (especially at
higher levels) comes from the university educated upper middle class, itself
in some countries a subgroup of a small urban elite. In many cultures, and
traditionally in Europe, diplomats were drawn from the aristocracy. The UN
has inherited this social inequality, as have the related academic
disciplines of international affairs and international law. Students on
prestige international exchange programmes in these areas typify this
extreme social inequality, yet UN personnel will often be drawn from that
group. Worse, despite drawing from all nations, the UN still discriminates
racially: the elites within each country over-represent the dominant ethnic
group. Immigrant minorities in Europe, or dispersed ethnic minorities in
general, have almost zero chance of a UN career. In truth, the UN
discriminates systematically, and shows no signs of changing. This in itself
disqualifies it as potential basis for any global authority: this point is
usually ignored by globalists. In a sense, the United Nations is the
aristocracy's revenge: they may have lost control of national governments
over the last three centuries, but might yet run the world government.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the alternative for a world divided into nation states is not
one nation state, but other forms of division. One nation is nationalism,
180 nations are nationalism, federations of nations are nationalism,
internationalism is nationalism, and the United Nations are nationalist. No
internal arrangement of nationalism can of itself justify it against other
"-isms". The number of states in a world order cannot justify that order.
Nor are hybridisations of a class of entities inherently superior to those
entities, or others. Transnational movements, international organisations,
cross-national exchanges: none are inherently morally good. The claimed
moral superiority of political cosmopolitanism and normative globalism is
based on logical errors: it is a fiction.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX: THE NATIONAL WORLD ORDER
The national world order is distinct from, and in opposition to, other
world orders. It claims, and effectively controls, all land surface. It is
an autonomy-minimising world order.
States are historically linked to one territory, so minimising territorial
conflict, especially compared to possible expansionist universalist
states.
State formation is limited to one type of group: nations or peoples. These
groups have distinct characteristics:
* permanent
* transgenerational
* show internal convergence around a core culture.
In consequence, states in this order have the following characteristics:
* permanent
* transgenerational - guaranteed by symbolic culture and the education
system
* symbolic culture is therefore important.
* the states codify activities and norms uniformly over territory
controlled - laws, administrative semi-law, national standards,
cultural policy, spatial planning - and so are definitely not just
'imagined communities'.
Population is stable: migration rates are very low related to
infrastructure capacity, with for instance a 1.4% average for intra-EU
migrants in EU states. State formation by migration is rare.
The inhabitants determine the goals of a state and not the other way
round. These goals are the collective goals of the nation or people,
primarily its continued existence. In effect, therefore, the goal of these
states is to project a segment of the past into the future.
Inhabitants are obliged to have an identity and culture, preferably
corresponding to one existing nation state.
There is constant de facto intervention among nation states to maintain
the monopoly of nations on state formation, an 'intervention' usually in
passive form, by non-recognition of any claim to territory by non-national
entities.
The national world order is functionally equivalent to a world state with
a nationalist administration. It is best seen as the best current
approximation to a single state with the characteristics of a large nation
state.
For a more detail, see the article Structures of Nationalism. Links on
linguistic globalism, the promotion of an artificial world-language, at
Language Futures Europe. Basic arguments on world government at Global
Government , World Federalism. Comment and links on syncretism, at the
syncretism site.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTES
1 Alexander Demandt Endzeit: Die Zukunft der Geschichte (Berlin: Siedler,
1993); Friedrich Berber Das Staatsideal im Wandel der Weltgeschichte.
(München: Beck, 1978). Besides summaries by these authors the history of
normative globalism is covered by J. ter Meulen Der Gedanke der
internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung 1300-1800 (Den Haag:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1917); W. van der Linden The International Peace Movement
1815-1874 (Amsterdam: Tilleul, 1987); Chris Brown, International Relations
Theory: New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1992). On world citizenship specifically: Derek Heater, Citizenship: the
Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (Harlow: Longman,
1990).
2 Michael Marien 'World futures and the United Nations: a guide to recent
literature', Futures 27: 3, 1995, pp. 287-310.
3 Roland Meister Ideen vom Weltstaat und der Weltgemeinschaft im Wandel
imperialistischer Herrschaftsstrategieen (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973).
The suspicion dates back to Engels: see Heater, Citizenship, p. 172 and p.
234.
4 For criticism of the claimed inevitability of nation-eroding globalism see
Fred Northedge, Fred 'Transnationalism: the American illusion', Millennium,
Journal of International Studies, 5: 1, 1976, pp. 21-27; Kevin Cox, 'The
politics of globalization: a sceptic's view', Political Geography 11: 1993,
pp. 427-429; and Anthony D. Smith, 'Towards a global culture?', Theory,
Culture, and Society. 7: 1990, 171-191; Anthony McGrew, 'Conceptualizing
global politics' in Anthony McGrew et al., eds., Global Politics:
Globalization and the Nation State Cambridge: Polity, 1992), pp. 1-28, p.
23.
5 For a recent explicit form of this monopoly claim see Anthony Giddens,
'Brave new world: the new context of politics', in David Miliband, ed.,
Reinventing the Left (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p.36. Globalisation is
claimed to inevitably restrict the process of state formation: this
implicitly leaves nation states intact.
6 Some people still write world constitutions: examples in the pages of
"United Planetary Federation": http:// www.upf.org/whatis.htm - or the World
Government www Site http://www.webcom.com/~worldgov/
7 Thomas Pogge, 'Eine globale Rohstoffdividende', Analyse und Kritik 17: 2,
1995, pp. 183-208.
8 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 'Governance and democratization', in James Rosenau
and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9 See http://www.cgg.ch/ - for summaries of its work and reports.
10 See http://www.oneworld.org/partners/- for list.
11 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to
Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Lynn Miller, Global
Order: Values and Power in International Politics, Third Edition (Boulder:
Westview, 1994); Richard Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global
Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 1995). Recent non-mainstream cosmopolitanism is
reviewed in Heikki Patomäki. 'Emerging Late-Modern reconstructivism',
Journal of Peace Research 31: 4, 1994, pp. 451-459. A recent article in the
Rechtsstaat tradition is Waldemar Schrekenberger, 'Der moderne
Verfassungsstaat und die Idee der Weltgemeinschaft', Der Staat 34: 4, 1995,
pp. 503-526.
12 Louis Snyder, Macronationalisms: a History of the Pan-movements
(Westport: Greenwood, 1984); Karl Haushofer, Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen
(Berlin: Zentral-Verlag, 1931); Jacob Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey: a Study
of Irredentism (London: Hurst, 1981); on Islam and nationalism see James
Piscatori, Islam in a world of nation-states (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986) and 'Islam and world politics', in John Baylis and
N. Rengger, eds., Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a
Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
13 A short and typical exposition is Lucio Levi, 'European citizenship,
cosmopolitan citizenship, and international democracy", The Federalist 35:
2, 1993, pp. 80-86.
14 Richard Falk The Promise of World Order: Essays in Normative
International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987); Richard Falk
Explorations at the Edge of Time: the Prospects for World Order
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); On Humane Governance, (1995).
15 See C. Colpe, 'Syncretism', in M. Eliade , ed., Encyclopedia of Religion
(New York: Macmillan, 1987).
16 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization as Hybridization (The Hague:
Institute of Social Studies, 1992 = ISS working papers, No. 152).
17 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 'L'état c'est fini?' in M. Karlsson et al., eds.,
Recht, Gerechtigkeit und der Staat (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1993); Max
Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of
Turmoil (Chatham: Chatham House, 1993), pp. 122-129.
18 See http://www.econet.apc.org/igc/igcinfo.html
19 Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGO's in World
Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (London: Routledge, 1994).
20 V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues, (Boulder:
Westview, 1993). The authors apply this description to movements, but extend
it implicitly to all women.
21 Thom Kuehls, 'The nature of the state: an ecological (re)reading', in
Marjorie Ringrose and Adam Lerner, eds., Reimagining the Nation (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1993), p. 150.
22 F. Manuel & F. Manuel Utopian Thought in the Western World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 522-525; Brown, International
Relations Theory, pp. 23-81.
23 Human rights and transnationalism are linked explicitly in Richard Falk,
'Theoretical foundations of human rights', in Richard Claude and Burns
Weston, eds., Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989), pp. 29-39.
24 Michael Burgess, 'Federalism as political ideology: interests, benefits
and beneficiaries in federalism and federation' in Michael Burgess, ed.,
Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future
Directions (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
25 James Rosenau, The United Nations in a Turbulent World (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992), pp. 11-21; 'Governance, order and change in world politics'
in Rosenau and Czempiel, Governance without Government, pp. 1-29.
26 R. Carneiro, 'Political expansion as an expression of the principle of
competitive exclusion', in R. Cohen & E. Service, eds., Origins of the
State: the Anthropology of Political Evolution (Philadelphia: Institute for
the Study of Human Issues, 1978); Christopher Chase-Dunn, 'World state
formation: historical processes and emergent necessity', Political Geography
Quarterly 9, 1990, pp. 108-130.
27 Anthony D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986);
Anthony D. Smith, "A Europe of nations - or the nation of Europe?', Journal
of Peace Research 30: 2, 1993, pp. 123-135.
28 Michael Smith, 'Modernization, globalization and the nation state' in
McGrew et al., Global Politics, pp. 253-268.
29 Hedley Bull & A. Watson The Expansion of International Society (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984); Hedley Bull The Anarchical Society: a Study of Order
in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
30 Peter Taylor 'Beyond containers: internationality, interstateness,
interterritoriality', Progress in Human Geography 19, 1995, pp. 1-15;
Anthony McGrew, 'Conceptualizing global politics'.
31 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, pp. 74-83.
32 Betty Reardon Sexism and the War System (New York: Teachers College
Press, 1985).
33 Johan van der Pot De Periodisering der Geschiedenis: een Overzicht der
Theorieën ('s-Gravenhage: Van Stockum, 1951); Alexander Demandt Metaphern
für Geschichte: Sprachbilder und Gleichnisse in historisch-politischen
Denken (München: Beck, 1978).
34 J. A. Schmoll, 'Stilpluralismus statt Einheitszwang - Zur Kritik der
Stilepochen-Kunstgeschichte', in Epochengrenzen und Kontinuität (München:
Prestel, 1985).
35 See for example Matthew Melko, 'Long-term factors underlying peace in
contemporary Western civilization', Journal of Peace Research 29: 1, 1994,
pp. 99-113.
36 Frantisek Graus, 'Epochenbewusstsein - Epochenillusion'; Odo Marquard
'Temporale Positionalität - Zum geschichtlichen Zäsurbedarf des modernen
Menschen', both in Reinhart Herzog and Reinhart Koselleck, eds.,
Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewusstsein (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1987).
37 Ken Booth, 'Human wrongs and international relations', International
Affairs, 71: 1, 1995, pp. 103-126, p. 119.
38 Democratic peace research is reviewed in Nils Pieter Gleditsch,
'Democracy and Peace', Journal of Peace research 29: 4, 1992, pp. 369-376.
The proposition is extended to oligarchic republics in Spencer Weart, 'Peace
among democratic and oligarchic republics', Journal of Peace Research 31: 3,
1994, pp. 299-316.
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Global government, world federalism
a simple summary of the objections.
